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gregate and coherent whole. In other words, everything which is the source of solidarity, everything that forces a man to take account of others and to regulate his movements by something besides his own selfish impulses, is moral; and morality is all the more vigorous when such ties are strong and numerous. . . . But for all that, we cannot be reconciled to a formula which makes morality a mere function of social interest. Without doubt, society could not exist if its parts were not in some way united. But solidarity is only one of the conditions of its existence. There are others, not less necessary, which are not moral. Moreover, in the net-work of ties which constitutes morality there may be some which are not useful, or which have force without reference to their degree of utility. The idea of utility, therefore, cannot be recognized as an essential element in our definition."

Attention is called to the originality of this conception of ethics, which has no resemblance to the views of Spencer, although it is also based on the inductive method. We can only point out here, in passing, that M. Durkheim's book treats many minor phases of the subject in an ingenious and able manner, as, for instance, in what he says of the relation of justice and charity (p. 129), and of egoism and altruism (p. 214).

E. BOIRAC.

PARIS.

LES LUTTES ENTRE SOCIÉTÉS HUMAINES ET LEURS PHASES SUCCESSIONNELLES. Par J. Novicow. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

This very interesting and very suggestive book, full of facts and ideas, applies the methods of physical and natural science to the study of moral and social questions. From this point of view it appears to be allied to the philosophy of the evolutionists, although it nowhere sets up Spencer as an authority. The conflicts of mankind are considered as a particular instance of a general law which embraces the entire universe. The book might have had for its motto the words of Heraclitus, "*ὁ πόλεμος πάτερ πάντων*." The author tries to prove that conflict is natural, universal, perpetual, and necessary, that it assumes a great number of forms, and that the most ancient and imperfect of these—war, massacre—the progress of humanity tends more and more to eliminate. He distinguishes two kinds of conflict, one slow and irrational (belonging to the past), including homicides, brigandage, slavery, robbery, persecution, intolerance, etc.; the other quick and rational (that of the future), using competition and argument. The book closes with a criticism, often very keen, of the errors of modern politics. The principal objection to be brought against it is that it is too discursive,

too redundant. The instances cited are so numerous and confusing that they obscure the main idea. As a German proverb says, "The trees hide the forest."

E. BOIRAC.

L'ANNÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Par F. Pillon. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893.

M. Pillon, with his teacher M. Renouvier, was one of the founders of Neo-Kantianism in France. For nearly twenty years they both applied the principles of their philosophy to all questions, moral, social, political, religious, literary, scientific, etc., in a valiant little weekly review, *La Critique philosophique*, to which they were almost the only contributors. Since this review ceased to appear, M. Pillon has in some degree replaced it by a sort of annual inventory of all the most recent philosophical publications in France, of which he has now given us the third volume under the title "L'Année philosophique." In it we find an interesting essay upon Schopenhauer and the "Metaphysics of Pessimism," by M. Renouvier; an original study by M. Dauriac on "The Nature of Emotion," in which he improves and very happily completes the well-known theory of William James; and finally a very learned exposition of the "Historical Evolution of Idealism, from Democritus to Locke," by M. Pillon. This is followed by a bibliography of French philosophy for the year 1892, which is a review by M. Pillon of all the works, large or small, that appeared in France during that year which could be of interest to philosophical students. They are arranged under the following headings: 1, metaphysics, psychology, and philosophy of science; 2, ethics, religious philosophy, and æsthetics; 3, philosophy of history, sociology, and pedagogy; 4, history of philosophy and criticism. These are all examined from the Neo-Kantian point of view.

E. BOIRAC.

DARWIN AND HEGEL. By D. G. Ritchie. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. xvi, 285.

The most obvious objection to these essays is their scrappiness. To get a system out of them is (if I may quote Mr. Ritchie against himself) "like trying to make your dinner off shrimps." But this is an objection which no one will care to urge in the face of Mr. Ritchie's own admission. He claims for them only the unity of stand-point. He is an Evolutionary Idealist, and these essays